We argue that a transaction tax is likely to amplify, not dampen, volatility in the foreign exchange markets. Our argument stems from the decentralized trading practice and the presumable discrepancy between 'informed'and 'uninformed'traders'valuations. Since informed traders'valuations are likely to be less dispersed, a transaction tax penalizes informed trades disproportionately, leading to increased volatility. Empirical support for this prediction is found by investigating the e¤ect of transaction costs on the volatility of DEM/USD and JPY/USD returns. High-frequency data are used and an increase in transaction costs is found to have a signi…cant positive e¤ect on volatility.
Introduction
There is an ongoing debate about whether transaction costs would increase or decrease the volatility in …nancial markets. Especially since Tobin's (1978) suggestion of a tax on all foreign exchange transactions intended to dampen alleged excess volatility, a number of studies have been published on this issue. The intuitive argument in favor of a general transactions tax is based on the idea that there are 'noise'traders whose trading is not based on information about security values, and hence, their trades may move prices away from securities'intrinsic values, increasing price volatility.
The problem with any indiscriminate transaction tax is, however, that it penalizes not only destabilizing speculative trades but also trades which help to anchor the market by providing liquidity and information. Therefore, as pointed out by several authors (e.g. Kupiec, 1996; Song and Zhang, 2005) , the net e¤ect of a transaction tax on price volatility will depend on the change of the trader composition arising from the implementation of the tax. In addition to that, a transaction tax may increase volatility by reducing market liquidity and increasing the price impact of individual trades (e.g. Heaton and Lo, 1995) .
There seems to be surprisingly little rigorous theoretical and empirical research on the e¤ects of a transaction tax on volatility, and the existing studies predominantly concentrate on the stock market. As such, all the results obtained in this setup do not necessarily carry over to the foreign exchange market, where trading is still distinctively decentralized. The most noteworthy theoretical studies, i.e. Kupiec (1996) and Song and Zhang (2005) , provide mixed results that can be used to rationalize both the conventional 'Tobinian'wisdom as well as the contrarian view. In this article, we argue that, when implemented in the foreign exchange market, a transaction tax is likely to reduce 'informed'trades more than it discourages 'uninformed'agents from trading. As a result, volatility is likely to increase due to an adverse trader composition e¤ect. The empirical evidence presented in the paper lends support to this unambiguous relationship.
Our theoretical argument stems from the decentralized trading practice and the presumable discrepancy between 'informed' and 'uninformed' traders' valuations of the asset. In the foreign exchange markets 'uninformed traders'or 'noise traders'can be viewed as agents who constitute the basic demand and supply in the market. A noise trader prone to sell (buy) has some 'idiosyncratic' reasons to have low (high) valuation for the asset. Among the uninformed traders are importers and exporters in need of a speci…c currency for their goods transactions. They can, to some extent, be assumed to be unconcerned about whether the currency they demand is fundamentally undervalued or overvalued. On the other hand, 'informed traders' can act either as buyers or sellers, depending on their opinion about the intrinsic value of the security and-given the uncoordinated and decentralized trading pattern-whether they contact a trading partner who has lower or higher valuation for the asset. E¤ectively the introduction of a transaction tax means an equal increase in transaction costs, and any transaction cost will obviously preclude trade between agents whose valuations di¤er less than the magnitude of this cost. Since it seems justi…able to think that informed traders' valuations are less dispersed than noise traders' valuations, a transaction cost is likely to hinder trade most among informed agents. Such an adverse trader composition e¤ect will then increase volatility, because traders with extreme valuations conclude transactions most frequently. Moreover, liquidity is reduced as potentially gainful trades remain unrealized and the price impact of successful trades is weighted.
In line with the existing theoretical literature, also most of the previous empirical work on the e¤ect of transaction costs on …nancial market volatility concerns stock markets. The studies in this literature make use of time series data around one-time regulatory or institutional changes such as the introduction of or an increase in the transaction tax (Umlauf, 1993; Jones and Seguin, 1997), the introduction of decimal quotation (Bessembinder, 2002) or a tick size change (Hau, 2003) . Unfortunately, the foreign exchange market has not experienced similar abrupt institutional changes that could be interpreted as natural experiments and that would allow for empirically testing the implications of our theoretical model. Moreover, a potential problem with the studies of this kind is the di¢ culty of controlling for other factors that may simultaneously a¤ect fundamental volatility. Therefore, we follow Aliber, Chowdhry and However, for the German Mark such a result could not be established. Unfortunately, their empirical analysis su¤ers from two potential shortcomings that may explain these somewhat contradictory …ndings. First their monthly data are highly aggregated: both the transaction costs and volatility can vary considerably within a month or even a day (see Figures 1 and 2 ) which can obscure the results. To this end, we use daily and …ve-minute data. Second, as pointed out by Werner (2003) , it is possible that the positive relationship between the conditional volatility and transaction cost results from changes in fundamental volatility causing changes in transaction costs. To solve this endogeneity problem an independent measure of fundamental volatility is needed, and we argue that the news count variable included in our data set can better be seen as such a variable than the spot market volatility suggested by Aliber et al. (2003) .
The empirical results with data on the German Mark and Japanese Yen (against the U.S. Dollar) lend support to our theoretical model: following an increase in transaction costs, price dispersion increases, even controlling for fundamental volatility.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formalizes our theoretical argument.
The data to be used in the empirical analysis is described in in 1998, whereas most of the trade occurred over the telephone based on bid and ask o¤ers conveyed to market participants on the screens of companies such as Reuters, Bloomberg and Bridge. While the share of electronic trading has increased over the recent years, the market is still highly decentralized and can be modeled as a random matching system. Moreover, the empirical evidence in the previous literature as well as in this paper almost solely concentrates on the direct market due to lack of available data on the electronic order-matching systems.
To derive the consequences of transaction costs on price dispersion, we consider the following simple setup that captures the main features of the market. Assume a continuum of traders who di¤er in their 'idiosyncratic'valuation for the security. The 'type'(i.e. the valuation) of a trader is a realization from the set = fi 1 ; i 2 ; n 1 ; n 2 ; g.
The types i 1 and i 2 are informed traders whose valuations are based on their estimate about the 'intrinsic value'of the security. The intrinsic value is normalized to unity.
The informed trader i 1 (i 2 ) has a pessimist (an optimist) opinion about the intrinsic value and his valuation is 1 " (1 + "). The parameter " captures the di¤erence of opinion between traders i 1 and i 2 . The symmetry of the opinions around the intrinsic value can be assumed without loss of generality because the correctness of the estimate does not play any role in the analysis.
1 . The types n 1 and n 2 , in turn, are noise traders with more extreme valuations 1 x and 1 + x respectively. We assume " < x=3 which guarantees that the trader n 1 (n 2 ) always acts as a seller (buyer) in the market and the di¤erence of valuations between traders is the lowest when the types i 1 and i 2 are matched to trade. For simplicity, we assume that traders are uniformly distributed over the set which means that each trader type is equally common in the market 2 .
Moreover, since traders meet randomly, each feasible trading opportunity is equally probable in the market.
Assume …rst that there are no transaction costs. Upon a meeting, the transaction is concluded at a price that splits the rent (the di¤erence of valuations) evenly among the traders. This practice corresponds to the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. If alike traders meet, there will be no rent to be shared and traders separate without completing the transaction. Table 1 summarizes the prices at which trade is conducted in each feasible trading opportunity.
The expected price is given by
which, due to the symmetry of valuations, equals with the intrinsic value of the asset. 1 The symmetry of the informed valuations also captures the plausible idea that the true intrinsic value can be computed as the weighted average of di¤erent opinions; i.e. the pieces of information dispersed in the market aggregates to perfect information. 2 This assumption can be made without loss of generality because the ex ante composition of traders does not a¤ect the qualitative results. 
The variance of the market price obtains
Assume now that there is a transaction cost C levied on each successful transaction and that this burden is evenly distributed between the traders. The cost C can be interpreted to represent the e¤ects of a transaction tax. Moreover, assume 2" < C x ", so that trade is no longer gainful between the informed agents i 1 and i 2 but is still feasible between the noise traders and between a noise trader and an informed trader. Hence, the trading opportunities between i 1 and i 2 at price p = 1 are omitted and other realizations are weighted in the price distribution. The expected price is still E[p p C] = 1 but the variance yields
Thus, as the transaction cost limits the trading opportunities between informed traders, the relative frequency of trades involving at least one noise trader is increased, which then leads to greater price dispersion, too.
In the above analysis we compared, for simplicity, the situations with and without a transaction cost. The fact that in practice there is virtually always a nonzero transaction cost does not change the qualitative conclusions. It is obvious that they generalize to the increase in the existing transaction costs.
Measuring Volatility and Transaction Costs in the Foreign Exchange Market
In this section we describe the construction of the data to be used in the empirical analysis. As a starting point we have the high-frequency data set HFDF93 compiled by Olsen and Associates, consisting of the Deutsche Mark-Dollar (DM/$) and YenDollar (Yen/$) exchange rate quotations from October 1, 1992 until September 30, 1993. These data have been examined before by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998a, b), inter alia. Although the sample period is relatively short, its length is comparable to previous empirical studies employing high-frequency …nancial data. As the markets are highly liquid, the amount of high-quality data is still more than su¢ cient for serious statistical analysis. Furthermore, one advantage of this particular data set is that it includes the ‡ow of money-market headline news on the Reuters AAMM screen that can be used to extract the fundamental market volatility to be used as a control variable as discussed below. 
where S b and S a denote the bid and ask prices, respectively. The rationale behind this measure can be seen by letting S denote the price of one unit of currency if the customer faces no transaction costs and noticing that the following equalities must hold for the transaction costs to be equal for buying and selling,
Solving for C now yields (1) . In what follows, the percentage measure 100C will be used.
The daily transaction cost measures and the realized variance of DM/$ and Yen/$ rates are depicted in Figures 1 and 2 , respectively. Visual inspection suggests positive correlation between variance and transaction costs. There are also some clearly exceptional periods. The DM/$ returns were very volatile at the beginning of the sample period, presumably due to the heavy speculation in the market involving several European currencies in September 1992 (see e.g. Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998a). In the transaction cost series, two periods are conspicuous; the highest spike corresponds to
Christmas and the second highest to Easter. The market was very thin around these days and the measure of transaction costs is bound to be inaccurate. In the empirical analysis, we use dummy variables to take these as well as some other holidays into account.
Empirical Results

Daily Regressions
To study the relationship between the volatility and transaction costs of exchange rate returns and to test the implication of a positive volatility e¤ect of an increase in transaction costs, realized variance was regressed on transaction costs and some control variables 3 . Because the realized variance turned out to be autocorrelated in both cases, its …rst lag was included in the models. In addition, dummy variables were introduced to take calendar e¤ects into account. First, a Friday dummy was included in all model speci…cations because speci…c events in the sample period often happened to occur on Fridays, as pointed out by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998a). Second, there was very little trading around certain national and international holidays, and hence, a dummy variable for these holidays was constructed. This dummy equals unity on the days listed in the appendix to Andersen and Bollerslev (1998a) and zero otherwise.
Finally, we also experimented with separate dummies for the most exceptional periods (Christmas and Easter), but they turned out to be insigni…cant at conventional levels, and despite their inclusion, the parameter estimates remained more or less intact.
Thus, the results of these model speci…cations are not reported.
The results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 2 . For both the DM/$ and Yen/$ returns the results of two di¤erent speci…cations are presented to examine the robustness of the results with respect to the holiday dummy. The parameters are, in general, very accurately estimated. However, the holiday dummy is not signi…cant even at the 10% level in the DM/$ return model, and thus we prefer speci…cation (2).
For the Yen/$ return equation, in contrast, the holiday dummy is highly signi…cant and speci…cation (1) is preferred. In both of these model speci…cations, the coe¢ cients of the transaction cost variable are positive and signi…cant at the 5% level. Also the lagged realized variance is signi…cant in each case. According to the diagnostic tests, error autocorrelation or autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity are not a problem and the RESET test does not provide strong evidence against any of the speci…cations.
Errors seem to be heteroskedastic, and therefore, t-statistics based on White's (1980) robust standard errors are reported. 4 In view of the t-statistics in Table 2 , there indeed seems to be a positive relationship between transaction costs and volatility for both currencies contrary to the …ndings of Aliber et al. (2003) . Thus, the results lend support to our theoretical model in Section 2. In order to get an idea of the economic signi…cance of this relationship 4 Because it is likely that the error terms of the equations for the DM/$ and Yen/$ returns are correlated, e¢ ciency gains could be obtained by estimating the model as a bivariate system. The di¤erences between such GMM estimates and the OLS estimates presented in Table 2 turned out to be minor albeit with somewhat smaller standard errors. Therefore, these results are not reported.
it is interesting to compute the e¤ect of, say, a 0.01% increase in the transaction costs on variance. To this end, we use the estimates of speci…cation (2) 
Intradaily Regressions
Above we have evidence that increases in transaction costs tend to increase daily conditional volatility. The daily data are, however, still quite aggregated in that transaction costs can vary over each day, and, therefore, it might be interesting to check whether this relationship also holds at the intradaily level. Even though the dataset contains all the quotes, building an operational model beyond the daily frequency is in practice complicated. As discussed by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998a), inter alia, especially intradaily seasonalities and market microstructure e¤ects have to be taken into account. To this end, we employ the Flexible Fourier form (FFF) regression originally introduced by Gallant (1981 Gallant ( , 1982 ) and applied to exchange rate returns by Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) . The model is estimated using …ve-minute returns to mitigate microstructure e¤ects. 5 The FFF regression equation takes the form 6 2 log
where R t;n denotes the return in interval n on day t, R the sample mean of the …ve-minute returns and b t an estimate of the daily volatility factor. N is the number of return intervals in a day (N =288) and N 1 = (N + 1)=2 and N 2 = (N + 1)(N + 2)=6.
The trigonometric functions are supposed to capture the smooth intradaily seasonal patterns in volatility. The dummies Friday and Holiday are de…ned as in the daily 5 In particular, as Daníelsson and Payne (2002) have recently pointed out, the bid and ask quotes such as ours, obtained from the interbank Reuters network are indicative rather than …rm in that they are not binding commitments to trade. Hence, at very high frequencies they may not accurately measure tradeable exchange rates. Daníelsson and Payne (2002) , however, show that at levels of aggregation of …ve minutes and above, returns computed from these data are a fairly good proxy for …rm returns. 6 This is based on the following decomposition for the intraday returns: R t;n = E (R t;n ) + t;n s t;n z t;n p N where t;n is the daily volatility factor, s t;n the periodic volatility component for the nth intraday interval, z t;n an iid(0,1) innovation and N the number of return intervals in a day. For details, see Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) .
regressions above, and Cost is computed using formula (1) with the bid and ask prices closest to the beginning of each …ve-minute interval. Here we are mostly interested in the e¤ect of the transaction costs on volatility (i.e. the coe¢ cient 1 ), while the periodic variation in volatility is considered as a nuisance. However, as the results in Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) suggest, ignoring these periodicities could yield misleading conclusions. In practice equation (2) is estimated in two steps. First, a GARCH(1,1) model is estimated for daily exchange rate returns to obtain the daily volatility factor b t . Then this b t is plugged into equation (2) which is estimated by ordinary least squares. Note that here we are only modeling the periodic component of volatility, so the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cients cannot be directly used to compute the e¤ect of the transaction cost on volatility. However, if 1 turns out to be signi…cantly positive, it indicates that an increase in transaction costs gives rise to increased volatility.
We estimated model (2) using the 74880 …ve-minute returns of both exchange rates. As expected, the …rst-step GARCH(1,1) models estimated using daily data from Table 3 . The error term is highly autocorrelated, and following Andersen and Bollerslev (1998a), Newey-West (1987) standard errors with 289 lags are used to compute the t-statistics. The choice of P = 4 turned out to be su¢ cient, and all the coe¢ cients are very accurately estimated. In particular, the estimate of 1 , the coe¢ cient of the transaction cost variable, is positive and signi…cant at any reasonable signi…cance level for both currencies. Thus these results lend support to the conclusion drawn from daily regressions that an increase in transaction costs indeed seems to lead to higher volatility in accordance with our theoretical model.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model explaining the e¤ect of an increase in transaction costs on price volatility in the foreign exchange market. As a starting point we have the decentralized structure of this market. In the model the market consists of uninformed and informed traders with the former group including importers and exporters in need of a speci…c currency. Many of the uninformed traders can thus be assumed to be relatively unconcerned about the 'intrinsic value'of the currency they demand. The 'informed'traders'participation, in turn, is motivated by their opinion about whether the currency is fundamentally undervalued or overvalued. We show in a simple decentralized trading model that a transaction tax will have a positive e¤ect on volatility if the informed traders'opinions are less dispersed than the noise traders' valuation. This is because the tax (e¤ectively meaning higher transaction costs) hinders 'informed' trades disproportionately, giving rise to an adverse trader composition e¤ect.
In support of the theoretical model, we also provide empirical evidence that increases in transaction costs (which proxy the presumable e¤ect of a transaction tax) lead to increased volatility in the foreign exchange market. This relationship seems to be both statistically and economically signi…cant at the daily level, and intradaily regressions reinforce this conclusion, suggesting that it does not result from and ours is that we explicitly take into account the e¤ect of changes in the fundamental volatility, thus controlling for the potential endogeneity problem. These …ndings are bad news to proponents of the Tobin tax whose main argument has been that a transaction tax on foreign exchange would decrease volatility. 
